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Software art is characterised by a close concern with the culture of 
software and the medium of programming.  This inevitably 
demands an engagement with the terrain of the instrumental; 
software is a sphere of tool-making and programming is governed 
by conceptions of functional (and generic) utility.  Yet where does 
this leave art?  If, in Kantian terms, art is defined by its 
uselessness (by its lack of any externally grounded necessity) and 
if, in classical critical theoretical terms, this alienation from 
function opens up a space of critique, then how can art explore 
and participate within the instrumental without abandoning its 
fragile critical autonomy?  This paper addresses this question, 
drawing upon Heidegger’s conception of technology and Plato’s 
conception of poesis to argue that critical software art can not 
simply oppose the instrumental character of software; instead it 
must acknowledge its own complicity in the operations of hiding 
and unreflective functioning that characterize the instrumental 
once the latter is re-conceived apart from the simplicity of human 
agency and humanly determinable ends. I examine one of my own 
software projects as a means of clarifying the dilemmas of critical 
aesthetic purchase that emerge as a result of this engagement with 
the instrumental dimension of software. 
Keywords 
Software art, aesthetics, instrumental, engines, tools 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary software art achieved its first notable recognition in 
2001 when a prize for ‘artistic software’ was awarded at the 
Berlin Transmediale media arts festival.  Subsequent key events 
included the 2002 Read_Me 1.2 Software Art/Software Art 
Games festival (Moscow) and the Whitney Museum’s 2002 
CODEeDOC exhibition (New York).  The jury for the 
Transmediale festival define software art in terms of its difference 
from new media.  Software art, they argue, shifts the focus from 
the visible surface of digital art to the constitutive space of code.  
Unlike traditional media, code, in their view, is not a passive 
intermediary; it does something, it is executable, it performs 
actions [23]. Programming represents a new condition of writing, 
in which the terrain of written abstraction obtains powers of 
curious literal agency.  On this basis, the jury rejects the 
conventional notion of software as a tool.  They argue that “digital 
code is virulent” [23], that it can only appear as a tool by 
disguising its actual operations.  Software art has the potential - 
and crucial aesthetic responsibility - to expose the machinations of 
code, to make code visible.  It represents an effort to reassert 
human, critical aesthetic agency and to counter the motions of 
hiding and disguise that are characteristic of code processes.  In 
this manner, it imagines a direct opposition between software art 
and instrumental software – projecting an aesthetic alternative of 
manifest and critically reflective code. 
My aim in this paper is question the viability of this approach, to 
suggest that the issues are more complex and uncertain.  This 
issue takes shape for me in relation to the uncertainty of one of 
my own works.  I describe it as a software art work, but with 
some hesitation.  The work lacks an adequate aesthetic 
manifestation – either as code or as visible interface.  It is a set of 
tools and an engine.  It is concerned with the representation of 
time and the pragmatics of enabling a temporal display.  The title 
of the work is Cropper/Propper/Gridder.  If the work is of any 
interest, it is because it pursues a poetic idea through instrumental 
means - or better, it struggles to discover a potential for poetry in 
the aesthetic estrangement of software.  While software art 
conventionally resists the instrumental character of software - 
struggling to make software aesthetically, reflectively appear - 
Cropper/Propper/Gridder deliberately engages with the aesthetic 
blindness of instrumental functioning. 
This paper begins by addressing the general issue of the relation 
between the aesthetic and the instrumental – considering how the 
self-definition of critical software art adheres to a very 
conventional aesthetic scheme and how, in contrast, Heidegger’s 
notion of technology [13] and Plato’s notion of poesis [20] 
suggest an alternative relation that is characterized by dimensions 
of affinity, resemblance and undecidable difference.  I then 
discuss Cropper/Propper/Gridder as a specific instance of the 
risking of the aesthetic within the terrain of non-identity and 
displacement that the instrumental represents. 
2. RETHINKING THE INSTRUMENTAL 
Within the tradition of critical theory, the notion of the 
instrumental is associated with a specifically modern mode of 
rationality that is oriented towards the purposive accomplishment 
of tasks, in the process deliberately bracketing questions of human 
value.  Instrumental rationality addresses issues of efficiency and 
running, ignoring wider ethical, political and cultural concerns.  
The sociologist Max Weber argues that this mode of reason takes 
characteristic form in the mechanisms of modern bureaucratic 
administration and industrial capitalism [25].  This broadly social 
conception of the instrumental is predicated on a more 
fundamental notion of the nature of an instrument.  An instrument 
is a device that moves but lacks free being.  It produces results but 
without any awareness of cause or result.  It functions 
unreflectively. It proceeds blindly.  In this sense, despite its status 
as a technical contrivance, an instrument - in its motion, in its 
running - comes to resemble the deterministic processes of nature.  
At the very outset of his discussion of art in his 1790 Critique of 
Judgement, Kant explains that “Art is distinguished from nature 
as making (facere) is from acting or operating in general (agere); 
and the product of the result of the former is distinguished from 
the latter as work (opus) from operation (effectus)” ([16] p.523).  
In the same manner, an instrument can be regarded as performing 
operations which produce effects rather than performing actions 
which shape (aesthetic) works.  This indicates the obvious 
dilemmas that confront any attempt to chart an association 
between the instrumental and the aesthetic. Conceived as 
intermediary, mechanical and unreflective, the instrumental 
appears directly opposed to the finality, freedom and reflective 
nature of art. 
2.1 Art and Engineering 
In 1920 the Russian Constructivist artist, Vladimir Tatlin, 
produced a proposal for the Monument to the Third International. 
He envisaged a 400 metre high steel and glass tower that 
incorporated a dynamic spiral structure and rotating internal 
rooms.  It was utopian art adopting the guise of an architectural 
plan and was criticized for its impracticality by revolutionary 
artists and politicians alike.  Another Constructivist artist, Gabo, 
cautioned Tatlin to “either create functional houses and bridges or 
create pure art, not both” [26]. The work was condemned for 
confusing two distinct languages and modes of making: art and 
engineering.  Furthermore it transgressed the conventional 
boundaries between the aesthetic end-in-itself and the sphere of 
useful things.  These flaws are also the basis for its lasting 
significance as an icon of avant-garde art.  The monument posed 
the essential problem concerning art’s relation to modern forms of 
making and, more generally, art’s relation to industrial modernity. 
Two broad historical strategies emerge in relation to this 
challenge.  On the one side there is the model supplied by Dada of 
incorporating technology and technological forms of making as a 
means of waging a multi-pronged assault on autonomous art, 
bourgeois humanism and instrumental rationality.  This approach 
takes archetypal form in Marcel Duchamp’s Large Glass – The 
Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (1915-23), which 
provides an ironic take on our pleasant fictions of love, free will 
and organic, human difference by representing human courtship 
and erotic coupling in mechanical terms.  In a parodic reference to 
the history of industrial machinery, the processes proceed 
upwards from steam, to internal combustion engine to electricity.  
This is not, of course, a working machine.  It is a playful, 
subversive, metaphorical apparatus.  It functions as a piece of 
critical commentary rather than as a literal instrumental device.  A 
crucial distance then is maintained between art and engineering so 
that art, however fractured, however affected by industrial 
modernity, can shape a properly aesthetic space of critique. 
The other strategy, evident especially in Constructivism and the 
Bauhaus, strives towards a unity of art and industry.  It projects an 
integration of the aesthetic (as mode of formal appearance) and 
the instrumental (as sphere of functional, mass-produced 
products).  Art abandons its reflective autonomy to enter into the 
texture of practical things.  While crucial as a critique both of art 
and alienated labour [5] ([14] p.12), this strategy runs the risk of 
providing an aesthetic sheen for forces that actually undermine the 
potential of art to suggest alternative social and imaginative 
possibilities.  Furthermore, this effort to draw a close association 
between the aesthetic and the instrumental is much easier to 
manage with simple, everyday things – coffee cups, tables, light 
fittings, etc. - in which form and function share a common 
immanent material being.  Software programming is harder to 
conceive in these terms because it institutes a separation between 
the domain of instrumental instructions and the visible interface.  
The former indicates a space of symbolic abstraction and 
functioning that is hidden from view - that is not instantly 
coextensive with the terrain of user interaction.  Although authors 
such as Donald Knuth [18] portray programming as a practical art 
which can be regarded aesthetically in terms of values such as 
economy and elegance, this has the unfortunate consequence of 
making the aesthetics of code only accessible to programmers and 
represents a return, as Cramer argues, to a very traditional neo-
classical aesthetic space ([7] p.10). 
In short, neither critical nor integrative strategies genuinely 
engage with the instrumental in its non-aesthetic distance.  Critical 
avant-garde art resists literal instrumental functioning while 
modernist design works to aestheticize the functional.  Neither 
provides an adequate means of conceiving the field of software 
programming, which refuses to adopt a conventional aesthetic 
form, which is directed elsewhere, which shapes instructions 
rather than an easily critical or conciliatory work.  If there is 
anything unique about the situation of software art it lies precisely 
in this search for an aesthetic rationale without the possibility of 
any recourse to the non-instrumental or the consolation of 
immanent form. 
2.2 A Problematic Definition 
The jury for the 2002 Moscow Read_Me 1.2 festival offer an 
influential definition of software art: 
“We consider software art to be art whose material is 
algorithmic instruction code and/or which addresses 
cultural concepts of software.” [22] 
Although intended to be inclusive, this definition works to 
obscure the key issue of the relation to the instrumental.  Instead it 
focuses on distinguishing two strands of software art practice - 
formally oriented code-based experimentation and culturally 
oriented software critique.  The formalist option is expressed in 
terms that recall the language of high modernism; the focus is 
upon defining the material essence of the software medium, which 
here takes the form of “algorithmic instruction code” [22].  In this 
manner, a complex cultural assemblage – a language and a field of 
discourse – is reduced to the status of a simple material, like paint 
or clay.  This reduction of code to the simplicity of an 
aesthetically malleable material is what enables formalist software 
art to be represented as a purely conceptual meditation on aspects 
of system without any integral concern with dimensions of 
culture.  However, a close engagement with the medium of code 
can have other implications.  It can have a cultural dimension.  It 
can represent an engagement with a specifically culturally 
determined discursive space.  More particularly, it can represent 
an interrogation of the instrumental language and strategies of 
conventional software.  But unfortunately, by positioning code as 
a base aesthetic matter, formalism loses sight of this possibility.  It 
is left to the other side of the definition to engage with software as 
a cultural phenomenon. 
But correspondingly, although the culturalist option “addresses 
cultural concepts of software” [22] it seems to lack a specific 
point of discursive purchase.  How is the nature of this mode of 
address to be described?  Is this critique spoken in the language of 
code as actual functioning software or is it expressed in other 
terms?  There is a need to explain how critical software art relates 
to the layer of instrumental, non-reflective language that provides 
the basis for its operations.  There is a need to think through the 
engagement with the material language of code.  In this sense, the 
cultural critique of software cannot be conceived apart from the 
apparently formalist option.  The distinction between formalist 
and cultural tendencies obscures this vital issue.  
If this bifurcated notion of software art is ultimately disabling, 
working to impoverish both formal experimentation and cultural 
critique, it is because it misconceives the field in terms of a 
tension between contrasting aesthetic tendencies rather than in 
terms of a more constitutive tension between art and the 
instrumental dimension of software. 
2.3 Software Becoming Art 
The notion of software art appears at one level as a transgression 
of ordinary aesthetic proprieties.  In a traditional avant-garde 
spirit, it seems to unsettle the complacent autonomy of art, 
insisting that art engage with a space of non-art - a realm of 
engineering and technical implementation.  Yet at another level it 
proceeds in an opposite fashion.  Rather than genuinely risking a 
relation to the alterity of another cultural and discursive space, it 
conceives software in terms of art.  It dialectically subsumes those 
aspects of software that are aesthetically useful and digestible, 
while discarding everything else. This is evident in as much as the 
specific characteristics of software art correspond to a very 
conventional aesthetic scheme.  It is worth briefly outlining the 
contours of this scheme in terms of Kant’s classical model of 
aesthetics and fine art. 
According to Kant (1980), aesthetics denotes a realm of non-
instrumental engagement with things.  It is a sensuously enabled 
mode of reflective judgement that rises above the dimension of 
sense to enter into dialogue with the apriori space of conceptual 
understanding [9] ([16] p.484).  The experience of beauty, for 
instance, relates to the recognition of order in the symmetrical 
forms of nature – mineral and organic forms that are not 
themselves conceptual but that nonetheless reveal a systematic, 
formal logic (pattern, unity and harmony); an order that is 
apprehended through the senses but that instantly summons an 
awareness of the universal and the metaphysical ([16] p.493).  
Fine art, as a specific experience of the beautiful, manifests a 
purposiveness without purpose, a disinterested, non-utilitarian 
demonstration of the felt rightness of the conceptual ([16] pp.524-
525).  It strips real objects of their ordinary reality, their 
contextual significance as objects that are practically desired, 
manipulated and used.  Art objects suspend the dimension of 
conventional instrumental utility in order to attain a higher 
conceptual utility as signs of an ultimate reconciliation of human 
faculties.  Their lack of instrumental utility takes the form of an 
organic finality, a dimension of formal coherence without goal.  
The production of art depends upon genius; an “innate mental 
aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art” 
([16] p.525).  Unlike instrumental craft, which is the product of 
practical, formulaic labour, fine art is conceived as a generative 
expression of the soul as a protean ‘second nature’ ([16] p.528).  
Kant’s aesthetic scheme is representative of an Enlightenment 
conception of art as non-instrumental, final, reflective and the 
product of genius. 
Now, without trying to suggest that contemporary conceptions of 
software art are strictly-speaking Kantian, there are curious 
affinities linked to how issues of instrumental function, reflection 
and artistic subjectivity are conceived. 
2.3.1 Function 
We have seen that software art characteristically resists the notion 
of software as a tool.  There is a strong preference for work that 
undermines utility and suspends ordinary functioning.  Adrien 
Ward’s Signwave Auto-Illustrator (2001) provides an iconic 
example, although it is a work that represents, in my view, an 
ambivalent relation to the instrumental.  In its adherence to the 
interface conventions of commercial creative software, Auto-
Illustrator at once deconstructs and delights in the notion of 
software as tool.  While the deconstructive orientation is 
emphasized, the manner in which the work draws inspiration from 
the conventional language of tool-based software escapes explicit 
attention. 
Software art’s suspicion of tools connects to the classical aesthetic 
bracketing of the instrumental, although clearly the aim is less to 
determine a pure space of disinterested perception than to 
critically respond to the dominant models of commercial 
application software.  Yet it seems to me that the rejection of the 
notion of the tool – as well as the rejection of the tool’s effort to 
disguise itself – creates fundamental problems for software art.  
Even if a piece of software is not ostensibly a tool, it must speak 
the language of tools.  It is devised as a system, an apparatus.  It 
functions.  As languages and discursive forms, programming 
languages bear the necessary imprint of the industrial forces that 
have shaped them.  The concept of a tool is implicit within 
programming structure – in the notion of an algorithm that 
processes data, an object that performs a specific (encapsulated) 
task and a procedure that runs more or less efficiently.  In 
bracketing all of this, in trying to think algorithm and procedure 
beyond the instrumental space of tools and tool functioning, 
software abandons a crucial point of aesthetic purchase.  The goal 
in my view is not to resist the notion of the tool, but to engage 
with issues of abstraction, disguise and efficiency, to somehow 
risk and re-imagine the aesthetic in an alien terrain. 
There are already models from within software – works that may 
not be primarily aesthetically constituted but that have aesthetic, 
poetic implications, revealing the potential for an instrumental 
imaginary.  Just to briefly mention three: Ivan Sutherland’s 1962 
Sketchpad, which was not only the first graphic drawing program 
but which, more particularly, as Allen Kay argues [17], re-invents 
drawing in terms of the conceptual structures of object-oriented 
programming; Richard Stallman’s Emacs (1975) which is a 
bizarre jalopy-style software, defiantly resisting task 
specialisation and ordinary boundaries between work and play; 
and finally even the modern integrated development environment, 
Eclipse (2004), which is utterly generically conceived – which can 
be radically reconfigured to accomplish different programming 
tasks and which appears as a kind of meta-tool, a tool for creating 
tools.  In my view these software tools are as much a source of 
inspiration as is work that is specifically (safely, neatly, clearly) 
positioned as software art. 
2.3.2 Reflection 
The primary motivation of software art is to encourage reflection 
upon underlying programmatic software processes. This notion of 
reflection is hardly the affirmative, grandly reconciling reflection 
of Kantian aesthetics – it is often, for instance, critical and 
deconstructive, but it nonetheless privileges code that does more 
than simply operate - that somehow finds the means to reflect 
upon its own operations.  Without wishing to altogether question 
this orientation towards reflection, the issue, as I have suggested, 
is more complex.  Programming entails relations that extend 
beyond the fantasy of visibility and self-collected reflection. 
This is evident at the very outset of modern computer science in 
Alan Turing’s model of computation [24] [10].  If Turing chooses 
to compute, it is because computation is mechanical, it proceeds 
stupidly step by step.  Computer programs may represent brilliant 
efforts of reflective analysis, abstraction and design, but program 
operations at the atomic level of specific digital events are utterly 
simple and unambiguous.  Reflection constitutes a problem for 
underlying digital processes, a quandary that suspends their 
functioning.  It is worth examining the play of reflection and 
machine unconsciousness in Turing’s famous halting problem.  
Turing reflects upon the mechanism of computation, upon its 
procedural logic.  He sets computation a reflective trap.  The 
universal machine is programmed to halt if it is stuck and proceed 
if it is not.  Then, in a crucial reflective step, Turing makes the 
computer process its own code.  Now, it seems, it must halt if it 
proceeds and proceed if it halts.  Unable to decide whether to 
proceed or to halt, the mechanism comes undone precisely 
through a motion of reflection. 
The jury for the Transmediale.01 festival suggests that the 
fascination of computer programming depends precisely upon 
code’s capacity to function, the passage it makes from a reflective 
conceptual state to one of actual machine processing: 
“Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of computing is that 
code – whether displayed as text or as binary numbers – 
can be machine executable, that an innocuous piece of 
writing may upset, reprogram, crash the system.” [23] 
Turing’s example suggests that this necessitates a relation of 
reflection to something other than reflection – to a space of blind 
motion that functions only on condition that it does not reflect.  
Programming demands a close engagement with this other space.  
It opens up a vital relation to the blindness of machine 
processing.  The aesthetics of code is as much about the unseen, 
the hidden and the disguised as it is about the reflective and the 
visible.  In this context, strategies of abstraction and 
encapsulation are also relevant – indeed as are all of the strategies 
that structure programming as a work of inscribing layers and 
guises above an unreflective foundation. 
Abstraction is not only the positive representation of something 
in a symbolic form; it is also indicates a motion of leaving 
behind.  That which is abstracted no longer itself appears.  It is 
replaced by the abstraction.  While this work certainly has a 
reflective aspect, its consequences are to make reflection itself 
more difficult.  The many layers of computational process work 
precisely to make lower layers disappear.  The principle of 
encapsulation denotes a particular form of this disappearance in 
which specific internal features of an object are deliberately 
hidden from view in order to protect them from unwarranted 
interference and to enable the simplicity of a general public 
interface.  Encapsulation works both to protect the integrity of 
individual objects and to enable them to be treated as simple 
building blocks in more complex structures.  A work of hiding 
then is implicit within the linguistic structure of contemporary 
programming.  Object-oriented programming involves 
choreographing a play of hiding and manifestation.  So while 
software art expresses a fascination with the executable character 
of code, it withdraws from the thinking of this space to the extent 
that it insists upon a purely reflective conception of software art. 
In an attempt to realize this reflective conception of software art 
the 2002 CODeDOC exhibition adopted the strategy of literally 
displaying code.  The first thing the user encountered was the 
code and only then obtained a link to what would ordinarily be 
described as the visible work.  While appropriate within the 
context of drawing attention to the normally neglected space of 
programming, this can hardly serve as a general strategy.  For a 
start, code is simply not meaningful to non-programmers.  Visible 
code asserts that code is significant, but beyond that it serves as 
little more than a connotative surface – indeed it can quickly work 
to mystify software art, to suggest some realm of arcane, abstract 
power that bears little relation to actual, practically-directed 
programming.  Even programmers have difficulty simply reading 
code.  Even the person who actually wrote the code can have 
trouble making sense of it (especially after a few days or weeks 
away from it).  Code is most legible as it is being written, 
especially in the alternation between writing and execution.  It 
resists entirely contemplative visibility (the traditional form of the 
aesthetic).  Code is engrossing within the overall event space of 
writing, performance and debugging.  In this sense, the notion of 
software art can be interpreted as the artist-programmer’s fantasy 
that coding may somehow take literal, exhibitable shape for an 
audience.  But this is not really possible.  Programming is 
essentially participatory rather than something to be seen (an 
aesthetic spectacle).  In order to become visible it has to persist 
with abstraction.  It has to hide and shape disguises.  It has to 
render the dimension of code metaphorically apparent.  Cramer 
and Gabriel acknowledge this point when describing the Web 
Stalker (IOD, 1997) alternative browser: 
“The code of the Web Stalker may dismantle the code of 
the Web, but does so by formatting it into just another 
display, a display which just pretends to “be” the code 
itself.” ([6] p.2) 
In this sense, the notion of rendering code visible entails 
something other than a puritanical resistance to code’s processes 
of disguise and layering.  Revelation is itself a staging, a 
manifestation, a motion away from origin. 
2.3.3 Expression 
Software art associates the aesthetic character of code with a 
dimension of personal inflection.  Florian Cramer and Ulrike 
Gabriel argue that: 
“[C]oding is a highly personal activity.  Code can be 
diaries, poetic, obscure, ironic or disruptive, defunct or 
impossible, it can simulate and disguise, it has rhetoric and 
style, it can be an attitude.” ([6] p.3) 
This is hardly the concept of aesthetic genius (which is actually 
much more ambiguous, which actually deeply problematizes 
issues of agency) but it places a similar emphasis on the 
expressive potential of code.  Code that is impersonal and 
formulaic appears less aesthetic.  In my view, however, code is 
inevitably formulaic.  There are all kinds of standard idioms, 
patterns and stylistic conventions.  It is less by resisting these and 
affirming some notion of personal, differentiated expression that 
code becomes aesthetic, but by pursuing the formulaic closely and 
intimately.  Rather than asserting subjectivity, it is a matter of 
finding it elsewhere, of re-inscribing it at a distance.  Code is only 
personally inflected within the texture and through the agency of 
impersonal formula. 
There is a vital need then to consider the instrumental character of 
software beyond the conventional framework of Enlightenment 
aesthetics.  As Derrida argues the tool is never a mere subservient 
vessel but always appears as a force that intimately affects and 
undermines the notion of human agency.  Writing appears as an 
aid to human memory but actually destabilizes human memory 
and renders it in other, alien terms [8].  Re-conceiving the 
instrumental character of the software tool depends upon 
considering the nature of a tool more closely, rather than turning 
away with a sense of traditional aesthetic disdain. 
2.4 Heidegger – Technological Revealing 
In his famous 1953 article, “On the Question Concerning 
Technology”, Heidegger begins by suggesting that “the essence of 
technology is nothing technological” ([13] p.287).  He is 
determined to reinterpret technology, to discover within it another 
meaning.  Heidegger questions the common sense view of 
technology as a neutral means to an end and as an expression of 
human agency.  He describes this view as “the instrumental and 
anthropological definition of technology” ([13] p.288).  This 
would seem to represent a similar rejection of human instrumental 
agency that we find within software art, yet the notion of the 
instrumental makes a strange return as the argument proceeds – a 
return in which the notion of a subservient means is thought apart 
from the necessity of original agency or determined end. 
Re-examining the nature of technological making as traditionally 
conceived (in the Aristotelian conception of techne [2]), 
Heidegger finds that it involves a motion of “bringing-forth” that 
is aligned with poesis ([13] p.293).  It also summons a more 
complex sense of causality which eludes the modern sense of 
means end rationality and engages with processes of revealing - 
the manifestation of truth ([13] p.294).  A classic instance is 
evident, perhaps, in Michelangelo’s conception of uncovering 
figures in marble; he less makes the figure (ex nihilo) than 
releases and reveals the inherent potential of the figure from 
within the marble.  In this sense the artist lacks absolute agency, 
appearing instead as a mechanism for an overall process of 
revealing (he is caught up in the mystery of Being). 
Heidegger argues that while this model appears applicable to 
traditional handicraft, modern technology radically changes 
things.  Rather than adapting to implicit nature – tending it and 
gently bringing it forth, modern technology exploits materials; it 
extracts from them and transforms them.  Materials become bare 
functional resources that are never revealed as such but that are 
instead stored up, ordered and operationalised ([13] p.298).  
Traditional processes permit the object its distinct appearance, 
autonomy and finality, whereas modern modes of technological 
manufacturing enable no space of rest or of contemplative 
existence: 
“Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and 
switching about are ways of revealing.  But the revealing 
never simply comes to an end.” ([13] p.298) 
This operational system affects not only natural materials and the 
technological devices but also the human beings that “run” them.  
All elements become regulated components within an overall 
mechanical constellation; none of them can ever be revealed in 
themselves – instead they constantly point elsewhere and only 
gain meaning in their systematic (differential) functioning. 
Surprisingly, rather than altogether rejecting this prospect of 
systemic displacement and human alienation, Heidegger discovers 
within it a sense of strange hope.  This hope is linked precisely to 
the instrumental character of modern technology; specifically to 
the ambiguous relation it opens up between revealing and hiding.  
Rather than directly, un-problematically, displaying Being in a 
natural and organic fashion (as evident in the model of traditional 
handicraft), modern technology shapes a blindness, a layering, a 
system of guises.  For Heidegger this has the potential to provide 
access to a deeper layer of revealing – the truth, precisely, that 
truth can never appears as such, that it is inevitably in disguise - 
dissembling and adopting the form of copy, metaphor and sign. 
Heidegger argues that humanity “keeps watch the unconcealment 
– and with it, from the first, the concealment – of all coming to 
being on this earth” ([13] p.313).  If “the essence of technology is 
nothing technological”, it is because it is actually about the 
ultimate mystery of being and revealing: 
“The question concerning technology is the question 
concerning the constellation in which revealing and 
concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth 
comes to pass.”  ([13] p.315) 
If this alternative thinking of technology appears dangerous it is 
because it risks becoming lost in the tissue of concealment – truth 
is no longer co-extensive with direct, lucid appearance.  It passes 
away from itself and beyond the control of self-collected, critical, 
human consciousness.  The anthropocentric dream of human 
control and mastery is abandoned in order to conceive technology 
in radical instrumental terms as an opening and a displacement.  
Hence, for Heidegger, the importance of art as both a species of 
techne and as a means of maintaining a human, reflective element: 
“[E]ssential reflection on technology and decisive 
confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the 
one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the 
other, fundamentally different from it.” ([13] p.317) 
However, art can only perform this task of maintaining reflection 
within the space of semblance and loss if it takes technology 
seriously, if it “does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth 
concerning which we are questioning” ([13] p.317).  The catch, 
however, is that this also necessitates a questioning of the nature 
of art as critique: 
“Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of 
technology, the more mysterious the essence of art 
becomes.” ([13] p.317) 
This mystery takes shape precisely as the risking of critique – art 
itself appears as a passage away from truth as simple revealing.  
This is not a consequence of its inevitable opposition to 
technology (the conventional romantic aesthetic attitude that 
contrasts irrational, sensible-material art to the rational abstraction 
of technology), but instead arises from a fundamental engagement 
with the problem of technology.  The mystery of art lies in its 
participation within the problematic of the instrumental. 
Heidegger’s conception of technology has clear relevance to the 
nature of software which is characterized by an enframed writing, 
a motion of functioning without human agency and by endless 
processes of structural hiding (abstraction and encapsulation).  Art 
cannot resist these processes by simply projecting a naïve 
opposite.  There is instead a need to insert itself within software, 
to partake of its processes, to follow its complex system of 
layering and dissembling. 
2.5 Plato – Inspiration and Mimesis 
Heidegger’s perspective emerges as a creative response to a 
specifically modern concern, yet there are also ancient models for 
this view.  It is easy to imagine an ancient unity of techne and 
poesis that is split apart within modernity, yet this sense of 
division is also apparent within the ancient world.  Plato, for 
instance, writing around the same time as Aristotle, is adamant 
that techne and poesis are fundamentally opposed [21].  Whereas 
Aristotle, in his On the Art of Poetry [3], positions (dramatic) 
poeisis as a domain of conceptually-guided skill, Plato, in his 
dialogue Ion, casts poesis as form of sympathetic magic, of 
intoxication.  The discussion between Socrates and the Homeric 
rhapsodist Ion sets out to establish that the latter rhapsodises not 
through the mechanism of clear aesthetic precepts and skills but 
through the agency of divine inspiration: 
“For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their 
beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired 
and possessed.  And as the Corybantian revelers when 
they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets 
are not in their mind when they are composing their 
beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of 
music and metre they are inspired and possessed.” ([21] 
p.5) 
For my purposes, what is interesting here is that inspiration 
renders the artist an instrument.  They are no longer in control, 
they can no longer entirely reflect upon, or claim essential priority 
for, the processes in which they are involved.  They are caught up 
in operations that exceed them.  Plato describes inspiration in 
terms of the metaphor of a magnet: 
“This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to 
them a similar power of attracting other rings; and 
sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and 
rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a 
long chain: and all of them derive their powers of 
suspension from the original stone.  In like manner the 
Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these 
inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, 
who take the inspiration.” ([21] p.5) 
The metaphor suggests a chain of inspiration that takes shape as a 
set of mediated relations.  The “original stone” can not itself be 
seen – it passes away from itself in order to manifest its attractive 
force.  Each iron ring – Homer, the Homeric rhapsodist Ion and 
the audience – is linked together instrumentally as an ordered 
sequence and as a chain of unconscious attraction. However the 
chain also gives rise to apparitions, because inspiration becomes 
manifest through appearances, through mimetic guises.  If Plato 
ultimately expels the poets from his ideal republic [21], it is not 
only because they encourage dimensions of irrational and 
emotional excess but because they produce beguiling appearances 
that are a “third remove” ([21] p.425) from truth.  Genuine truth 
has its home in the sphere of abstract, mathematical form, whereas 
human beings live in the world of appearances (dark and shadowy 
and yet visible), and artists create appearances of appearances.  
The fundamental paradox is that inspiration has its basis in the 
revelatory experience of music and metre (which traces intimate 
links to the realm of ideal truth), but instead of producing truth it 
gives rise to falsehoods.  Just like technology (conceived in 
Heidegger’s terms) mimetic art renders revealing as concealing. 
We find then that Plato’s rejection of the mechanism of art 
(techne) only enables its more thorough grounding within art – not 
as conceptually guided, skill-based practice, but as the 
instrumental character of techne which here informs the nature of 
poetic inspiration and mimetic form; taking shape as the 
suspension of self-collected human agency and in systems of 
dissembling that chart an undecidable relation between the 
revealing and concealing of truth. 
How can Plato’s scheme, in which the aesthetic and the 
instrumental discover a surprising space of association, contribute 
to a re-evaluation of the status of the instrumental within software 
art?  The layers of abstraction that characterize code operations 
are certainly not mimetic, but they obey the fundamental form of 
mimesis inasmuch as they involve a motion away from self-
present origin.  Similarly, although Plato’s conception of poetic 
intoxication may seem very distant from rational software 
processes, the notion of involuntary poesis - in its automatism and 
blind pull - summons a sense of Turing’s concern with the 
universal machine’s dumb mechanical functioning.  Within this 
context it is worth recalling that Adorno and Horkheimer conceive 
instrumental rationality precisely in terms of a limit point of 
reason in which rationality and irrationality coincide ([1] p.172).  
If instrumental rationality reveals an irrational dimension, it is not 
only in terms of the division it opens up between episteme 
(knowledge of invariable principles) and phronesis (morally 
guided practical action), but also in terms of its suspension of 
human agency, its orientation towards an automatism that 
inevitably comes to resemble intoxication. 
3. CROPPER/PROPPER/GRIDDER 
Overall then the genuine aesthetic potential of software lies in 
engaging with everything within software that seems most 
intrinsically inimical to the aesthetic – dimensions of instrumental 
function, non-reflective process and formulaic expression.  Rather 
than struggling to find means of lifting up software to the status of 
art, there is a need to delve into the instrumental character of 
software, to genuinely engage with this space of risk and aesthetic 
alienation.  This is what Cropper/Propper/Gridder attempts.  The 
work provides an example of an effort to conceive the relation to 
the instrumental differently.  If it does not take adequate shape as 
either a piece of software art or genuinely useful tool, then it is 
because it is concerned to explore a space of tension and awkward 
possibility. 
3.1 An Awkward Possibility 
The name itself is awkward.  Cropper/Propper/Gridder refers to 
three separate pieces of software that together form an apparatus 
for decomposing video and playing it back in discrete, grid-based 
portions.  When it was exhibited, however, the work had a 
different name.  It was called Ice Time, which related to a specific 
instance of the work which focused on video sequences from the 
Ross Sea region in the Antarctic.  This suggests another 
dimension of awkwardness; that of the distinction between the 
visible interface with its specific instances and the generic 
character of the work as an engine, as a mechanism of 
decomposition, choreography and display.  Which of these 
demands attention?  Which of these has a properly aesthetic 
character?  Or is it both?  If so, how are they to appear 
simultaneously?  What would this mean?  The work raises these 
kinds of awkward questions.  Prior to considering its uncertain 
status as a piece of software art, there is a need to provide more 
detail about the work itself, considering the underlying concept, 
the technical system and the exhibition context. 
3.1.1 Concept 
The project had its basis in the philosopher Henri Bergson’s 
condemnation of the cinematographic representation of time [4].  
According to Bergson, time as duration represents a qualitatively 
whole motion that cannot be subdivided without fundamentally 
altering its character:  
“All is obscure, all is contradictory when we try, with 
states, to build up a transition.” ([4] p.313) 
Film, as a technology for cutting up time into frames and 
reassembling it for illusory temporal display, appears as a 
metaphor for the modern alienation from the genuine experience 
of duration.  In response to this, I wondered, perversely, whether 
time was not better experienced through a mechanism; not as a 
predictable linear sequence, but as a work of setting time astray, 
of manufacturing, emphasizing and exacerbating its obscurity.  I 
was thinking of projectors that run too slowly, in which the 
individual frames are visible, in which a sense of time emerges 
precisely through the disengagement of actual continuous time, in 
which time is manifest not as a single flow but as a set of 
flickering instants which serve both as an alienated reminder of 
some other time and as an immediate, yet dislocated, perception 
of current duration. 
This interest, this thematic space, is clearly not unique.  It charts 
relations to long-standing aesthetic concerns within avant-garde 
film and video art, from the exploration of aspects of temporal 
sequence in Dziga Vertov’s 1929 Man with a Movie Camera, to 
Chris Marker’s concern with the invisible time of the black film 
leader in Sans Soleil (1983), to the Australian artists, Rodney 
Glick and Lynette Voevodin’s display of columns of hours from a 
single day in 24Hr Panoramas (1999-2006).  It also connects to 
the tradition of experimental new media which explores issues of 
time in terms of the re-combinatory possibilities of computation 
[15].  Some influential works include Joachim Sauter’s and Dirk 
Lusebruk’s Invisible Shape of Things Past (1995) which 
reconstitutes time slices as peculiarly non-temporal, sculptural 
entities, Martin Reinhart’s and Virgil Widrich’s tx-transform 
(1992-2002) which swaps the axes of temporal and spatial 
representation, and most relevantly Camille Utterbach Liquid 
Time (2001-2) which enables portions of the video frame to play 
at different speeds and in different directions.  My work explores 
similar possibilities.  It decomposes the video frame into rows and 
columns of independently playing image sequences - in an effort 
to stage both the deconstruction of ordinary time and a 
summoning of temporal alterity. 
It is at this point that the conventional aesthetic idea necessarily 
engages with a technical imaginary.  There is a need to consider 
how the various aspects of the system can be implemented.  
There is a need to devise systems, tools, engines.  There is a 
temptation to disregard this as a work of subsidiary technical 
implementation, but for me it indicates the vital process in which 
the aesthetic concept takes practical and poetic shape as an 
instrumental apparatus. 
3.1.2 Technical System 
Figure 1 displays a diagram of the display system.  The screen is 
composed of any number of squares which may or may not be 
arranged in a grid based manner.  Each square is composed of a 
set of sequences of still images.  Each sequence may be played 
independently and in various ways (in terms of speed, direction, 
etc.).  Sequences may have associated sound files which may 
loop or play a specific number of times.  Finally aspects of 
playback may be choreographed in advance or enable live 
interactive control. 
 
Fig. 1: Brogan Bunt, Cropper/Propper/Gridder design concept 
The basic technical challenge involved finding means to 
decompose a video sequence into a set of independently playing 
image sections.  The neatest and most logical approach was to 
employ a single video file and dynamically decompose and 
reassemble frames from the cube of spatio-temporal data.  For 
long sequences, however, this was likely to demand retaining a 
very large number of frames within RAM and a constant process 
of multi-frame analysis to constitute any specific display frame.  
This is probably technically feasible but seemed beyond my 
means.  Another obvious approach was to cut up the video in 
advance and play back any number of independent video streams.  
This proved unworkable due to the considerable overhead that 
each stream of video imposed on the overall system.  It was not 
possible to play back more than a couple of video files at once.  
My only other option was entirely simple, even anachronistic.  It 
involved conceiving the video sequences as game-style sprites.  
Video sequences were decomposed into sets of video stills and 
then decomposed again in to sets of cropped images.  Represented 
as sprite arrays, these sets of cropped images could be played back 
in conventional sequential order, randomly or in any number of 
specific algorithmic ways.  This was the approach I adopted and 
miraculously it seemed to work even for a finely articulated grid 
(60 or so sequences running simultaneously), but it had one major 
drawback.  Instead of a single video file or a relatively small 
number of cropped video files, I had multiple directories filled 
with innumerable tiny image files.  In this sense, it was a plainly 
awkward and inefficient solution.  Moreover, in its literal 
complexity, in its fragmentation of data, it opened up the necessity 
for a set of specific tools to handle aspects of decomposition, 
choreography and display. 
3.1.2.1 Cropper 
Cropper is a small and unassuming utility program that handles 
the process of first cutting up sequences of video stills into rows 
and columns of cropped images and then saving them within an 
appropriate directory structure.  It obscures the major part of its 
underlying functioning, merely displaying dynamic information 
concerning the percentage of images processed. 
3.1.2.2 Propper 
Propper is a much more ambitious program.  The role of this tool 
is to produce the underlying score that choreographs aspects of 
display.  It builds XML (Extensible Markup Language) 
description files that the display engine, Gridder, reads in order 
to know what media to load when and where.  XML makes 
dimensions of logical structure visible, legible and easily 
accessible (within text editors, browsers and so on), however it 
can be slow to prepare manually.  Propper provides a rapid, 
visual means of writing these files. 
3.1.2.3 Gridder 
Gridder is the display engine.  A dialogue opens requesting that 
the user point to a relevant project directory.  Gridder reads the 
project xml description file and commences media display.  
Additionally, the software enables interactive control of the 
playback parameters of image sections.  Gridder displays in a 
screen window with a standard title bar.  This is intended to 
remind the viewer/user that the work is a piece of software, not a 
piece of linear, pre-constructed video. 
Figure 2 displays a screen shot without the title bar to provide a 
sense of the visible output of a more complex piece (a 9X3 grid 
with multiple ‘video’ sequences). 
 
Fig. 2: Brogan Bunt, Gridder, Ice Time exhibition (2005) 
3.1.3 Exhibition 
The emphasis was upon the display of fragmented video 
sequences of the Antarctic. The choice of footage was deliberate.  
Antarctica is generally perceived as a space of pure glacial 
duration, yet we have recently become aware of its extreme 
temporal fragility; the Antarctic is entering another time – a time 
of division, of breaking up, even of imminent catastrophe.  
Without pursuing this point in an explicit political manner, the 
conjunction of the software apparatus (as a work of temporal 
decomposition and the flickering re-summoning of time) and the 
samples of an entirely fragile realm of duration suggests a 
dimension of temporal uncertainty that has political implications. 
Leaving aside the specific thematic issues addressed in this 
exhibition, the issue that mainly concerned me was the near 
invisibility of the Cropper/Cropper/Gridder apparatus in the 
exhibition display.  Although I had spent close to two months 
producing the software and perceived it as the vital context in 
which the aesthetic concept took generic shape, there seemed no 
satisfactory way of acknowledging the apparatus, of making it 
appear aesthetically.  I was very aware that the project may appear 
as a work of video compositing rather than software art.  It is this 
sense of uncertainty (and frustration) concerning how to 
adequately exhibit the work that has prompted this specific 
reflection on the instrumental. 
3.2 Software Art? 
The vital problem that the project raises for me is in identifying 
the properly aesthetic character of the work.  A conventional view 
would distinguish between the aesthetically significant exhibited 
work and the aesthetically inconsequential background technical 
infrastructure.  The contemporary notion of software art seems to 
provide a corrective to this view but ends up insisting upon a non-
instrumental model of software as a form of abstract formal 
enquiry and/or self-reflexive software critique that has the 
unfortunate consequence, once again, of positioning the 
instrumental component of Cropper/Propper/Gridder as a work 
of mere technical implementation.  At the same time the software 
art status of the exhibited interface is questionable because it is 
less about reflectively revealing the dimension of code than about 
setting code into relation with the particularity of specific 
temporal samples.  On what basis then do I regard the overall 
project as a work of software art? 
The project represents a meditation on issues of the coded, 
discontinuous character of represented time that is conducted 
through the medium – the linguistic and discursive forms – of 
software.  In this sense, it represents an example of what Mathew 
Fuller describes as “speculative software” ([11] p.29).  Although 
the boundaries blur, Fuller distinguishes speculative software 
from “critical software” ([11] p.22) in that the former is oriented 
less towards deconstruction than making; it engages with “the 
havoc of invention” ([11] p.32).  Cropper/Cropper/Gridder may 
be regarded as a speculative apparatus; it takes shape as a perverse 
media player, one in which the dimension of time is disarticulated 
and re-composed. 
The work gains aesthetic coherence as an overall system that 
includes an element of generic operation and specific 
instanciation.  In terms of the generic character of the work, the 
underlying poetic idea is realized as a linked system of functional 
tool-based operations which together form an abstract machine, an 
engine.  Cropper represents the motion of decomposition, 
Propper the work of reassembling, and Gridder the rendering of 
an unnatural spatio-temporal logic in actual time.  In its operation, 
the engine inevitably structures a moment of instanciation.  The 
aesthetic dimension of the latter emerges in the friction between 
coded time and the particularity of sampled actual time.  Without 
an awareness of the background software, this sense of friction is 
lost.  The dimensions of interface and implementation are 
integrally aesthetically related. 
The instrumental orientation represents an important aesthetic 
choice.  The strangeness and technically anachronistic character 
of the project is heightened precisely by pursuing it through the 
agency of the instrumental, by discovering means to realize a 
perverse, absurd, idiosyncratic idea as efficiently as possible.  
Accordingly, at a stylistic level the software resists adopting a 
conventional aesthetic guise; it is deliberately blankly ordinary.  
The Java Swing style interface elements – menus, tabbed panes, 
hierarchical lists, radio buttons, etc. - interested me particularly in 
their anonymity and their embeddedness in the logic of 
instrumental software production and use.  If the explicit 
conceptual theme is the alienation of time via mechanical division 
then the choice of a blank instrumental style works in my view to 
heighten the sense of alienation.  
Of course, the problem is that none of this was seen by the 
exhibition audience.  This is written then as a critique of the 
work’s original mode of exhibition.  The work needed to 
demonstrate both the engine and the interface in order to properly 
address the conceptual theme of the coded representation of time, 
as well as the equally important theme of the relation between an 
instrumental apparatus and an aesthetic concept. 
4. CONCLUSION 
My overall argument is that rather than positioning the 
instrumental, tool-based character of software as some grim fact 
that must be rigorously resisted there is vital need to work 
through the instrumental, to explore its possibilities.  This entails 
a risk – the risk of facilitating software functioning, of engaging 
with its work of abstraction, encapsulation and disguise.  It 
projects a space of uncertain creation that cannot altogether shake 
off a relation to the blindness of mechanical process - that must 
find means to reflect amidst a work of operational making.  The 
clear difficulty is in finding ways to conceive a work of critical 
reflection within the texture of instrumental relations when the 
self-consciousness of critical awareness is precisely what is put at 
risk.  In my view there is no easy solution to this dilemma.  
Instead there is a constant work of negotiation - of engagement 
and distanciation with whatever it is that an instrumental device 
and an aesthetic work represents.  This would seem to demand a 
re-examination of the relation between “software culturalism” 
and “software formalism” ([7] p.10).  It may be that it is precisely 
at the level of form (regarded as a material discursive fact and 
experimental space) that the most profoundly cultural questions 
are raised.  Of course, how these questions are to be articulated - 
how they are to take constitutive shape as processes, engines and 
interfaces - remains an open question. 
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